A Comparison of Iraq and the Philippines

By MAJ Richard C. Kaserman

100 Years Too Late: A Comparison of Insurgency in Iraq and the Philippines

As the United States Army conducts counterinsurgency combat operations in Iraq, comparisons have been made between modern-day operations in Iraq and the army’s efforts in Vietnam in the 1960’s. While the current Iraq conflict does in some aspects resemble operations by the United States Army in Vietnam, the debate of whether Iraq resembles Vietnam in the military profession and the popular media appears to have obscured valuable lessons that could have been taken from the Philippine Insurrection. All military operations and situations are unique; history does not precisely repeat itself. However, many similarities exist between the Philippine Insurrection and the Iraqi Insurgency, and these similarities draw clear parallels between these US Army operations that occurred 105 years apart. Arguably, a close study of the Philippine Insurrection provides valuable insights into the current counterinsurgency conflict in Iraq. A delineated study of the lessons of the Philippine Insurrection regarding political and diplomatic goals, security requirements of the civilian population, political action, recruitment of local security forces and legal procedures may have potentially created an acceptable outcome in Iraq much earlier and with fewer US and Iraqi casualties.
The Spanish-American War preceding the Philippine Insurrection lasted from April until December 1898 and relied heavily on the mobility and firepower of the US Navy. This war was generally popular with the public and was considered by some to be the model of a short war. Similarly, the Invasion of Iraq came soon after the successful and rapid takedown of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan, which was popular with the public and, with its small ground troop commitment and heavy reliance on airpower, was considered by some to be the prototype for future wars. In the Philippine Insurgency, as during the Iraq operation, the United States began the operation with barely enough troops to conduct conventional combat operations.[1] In both the Philippines and later in Iraq, when the enemy transitioned conventional operations to an insurgency, the Army had, in the opinion of many observers and participants, too few troops to conduct counterinsurgency operations.[2] During the period of the Spanish-American War and the Philippine Insurrection, virtually every officer in the Army served in Cuba, Puerto Rico, or the Philippines.[3] In the present era, due in part to the Iraqi Insurgency, the vast majority of Army officers have served in either Iraq or Afghanistan. A comparison of the Iraq insurgency and the Philippine Insurrection provides valuable lessons for the current military professional, since there are valuable lessons learned for the Army in these two insurgencies.
On 1 May 1898, a squadron of the United States Navy defeated and sank the Spanish fleet in the Philippines and forced a de-facto cease-fire with the Spanish forts around Manila.[4] On 30 June 1898, the first 2,500 soldiers of Eighth Corps arrived in Manila to conduct military operations against the Spanish forces in the Philippines.[5] By the beginning of February 1899, a combination of military, political and diplomatic events would trigger the start of the Philippine Insurrection.[6]
Upon landing in the Philippine Islands, both the Navy and Army commanders understood clearly the military goal of defeating the Spanish fleet and Spanish forces in the Philippines.[7] However, initially, these commanders were uncertain of the political and diplomatic goals associated with the Philippine campaign. Even as the Spaniards were surrendering, MG Wesley Merritt, the commander of Eighth Corps, was given vague instructions that were hard to comprehend beyond the task of setting up a temporary military government. These unclear instructions created complex difficulties for the American military leadership in the aftermath of the surrender of the Spanish garrison in Manila.[8] In Iraq, the political and Department of Defense civilian leadership underestimated the requirement for security, reconstruction and civilian governance, and therefore planning for postwar contingencies was woefully inadequate. Within several days of arriving in Iraq, LTG (Ret) Jay Gardner, the head of the Office of Reconstruction, was replaced by Paul Bremer and the Office of Reconstruction was absorbed into the Coalition Provisional Authority. In summation, both the Iraq and Philippine operations suffered from unclear and/or unformed political and diplomatic objectives which adversely impacted military operations during the initial stages of the insurgency. The obvious difference between Iraq and the Philippines was that MG Otis, the commander in the Philippines, understood implicitly from his experiences in the Indian wars that security and isolating the civilian populace from the insurgents was critical from the outset in order to establish functional civil government.[9] Due to the modern Army’s focus on major conflict and lack of experience with pacification, this same lesson regarding security of the civilian populace in Iraq took over three years for the Army to learn, understand and implement.
In order to conduct these required security tasks to secure the civilian populace from insurgents, the proper number and type of security forces had to be brought to bear. In both the Philippine and Iraq operations, shortages of trained soldiers had to be overcome to provide the forces necessary to defeat the insurgent forces militarily. During the Philippine Insurrection, MG Arthur McArthur achieved the forces necessary to implement the “Policy of Chastisement” in December of 1900 when he had 70,000 veteran soldiers to carry out his policies.[10] To support the “Surge” in Iraq in January 2007, force levels in Iraq were boosted by approximately 30,000 soldiers in addition to the 145,000 already on the ground. Both the Surge and the Policy of Chastisement were successful mostly due to their effect on the enemy’s will. However, neither the Surge nor the Policy of Chastisement would have been successful in isolation. Both the Surge and Policy of Chastisement were linked to policies encouraging insurgents to surrender or to switch sides. Further, both the Surge and the Policy of Chastisement were short-term and targeted operations. The real long-term change engendered by the Surge and the Policy of Chastisement was their utility in standing up and training native forces. The differences were primarily the extent to which “hard war” measures against selected civilian populations such as concentration of population, crop seizure, devastation and destruction of civilian property in selected were utilized in the Policy of Chastisement in the Philippines.[11] Similar measures were not taken against civilian populations during the Surge in Iraq.
In order to move beyond defeat of the insurgents to the structural destruction of the insurgent infrastructure, the Army recruited local auxiliary forces both in Iraq and the Philippines. In Iraq, both because of its prewar ineffectiveness and the fact it was dissolved by the Coalition Provisional Authority as a “debaathification” measure, the US Army was forced to reconstruct the Iraqi military essentially from scratch. Because of issues with police corruption, sympathy and support for the insurgency and desertions, the various Iraqi police agencies also required nearly complete reconstitution. In addition to the near-total reconstitution of the police and the military, the United States military forces also formed other auxiliary forces to combat insurgents, most notably the local security forces known as the “Sons of Iraq”. Similarly, in the Philippines the Army set up a variety of Auxiliary and local forces to conduct operations against insurgents, bandits, and other security threats. U.S. Army units manned by U.S. officers and Filipino soldiers (Philippine Scouts), a National police force consisting of U.S. and Filipino personnel (Philippine Constabulary), local police, volunteer militia, locally recruited security personnel, secret agent networks and auxiliary personnel were all utilized to defeat the Philippine Insurgency.[12]
In order to legitimize a counterinsurgency, it is critical to set up a legal mechanism to adjudicate the guilt or innocence of suspected guerillas and sympathizers and duly sentence the guilty to an appropriate punishment. In the Philippines, the Army initially relied on the Lieber Code and General Order 100, as well as the so-called “Policy of Attraction”. Later, civil government and courts were established in the Philippines between 1901 and 1902. Like the Iraqis in the 21st Century, the Filipinos at the turn of the 20th century were less than impressed with the US system of courts, either military or civilian, since harsh sentences, even when justified, were often overturned.[13] Further, the Philippine Insurgents, like their Iraqi counterparts a century later, largely exceeded their American enemies in brutality, which caused much of the populace to remain neutral or even eventually turn against the insurgents.[14] However, this factor also reinforces the requirement to secure the majority of the civilian populace, as in both the Philippines and Iraq, insurgent brutality coupled with deficiencies in local security impeded cooperation by the population with the counterinsurgent forces.
All military operations and situations are unique; history does not precisely repeat itself. However, examining the many similarities between the Philippine Insurrection and the Iraqi Insurgency is valuable in understanding the dynamics of insurgency. Enough similarities exist to draw clear parallels between these US Army operations that occurred 105 years apart. In comparing the Philippine Insurgency to the current conflict in Iraq, it is hard to avoid the conclusion that better study of the lessons of the Philippine Insurrection with regards to political and diplomatic goals, security requirements of the civilian population, political action, recruitment of local security forces and legal procedures possibly could have created an acceptable outcome in Iraq much earlier and with fewer US and Iraqi casualties.
[1] Andrew J. Birtle, U.S. Army Counterinsurgency and Contingency Operations Doctrine 1860-1941. (Washington, D.C. Center of Military History, United States Army, 2004), 108.

[2] Ibid, 116.

[3] Ibid, 100.

[4] Graham A. Cosmas, An Army for Empire; The United States Army in the Spanish-American War. (College Station, Texas: Texas A&M University Press, 1998), 239.

[5] Ibid, 201.

[6] Ibid, 310.

[7] Ibid, 110-111

[8] Ibid, 113.

[9] Andrew J. Birtle, U.S. Army Counterinsurgency and Contingency Operations Doctrine 1860-1941. (Washington, D.C. Center of Military History, United States Army, 2004), 113.

[10] Ibid, 129.

[11] Ibid, 129-130.

[12] Ibid, 116-117.

[13] Ibid, 125.

[14] Ibid, 124.